All Animals Are Equal

Published: November 18, 2024

Paper Title: All Animals Are Equal
Link to Paper: https://philpapers.org/rec/SINAAA
Date: 2001
Paper Type: Philosophy
Short Abstract:
In the paper, Peter Singer argues that just as it is wrong to discriminate against Black people because of their race or women because of their sex, it is also wrong to discriminate against animals simply because they belong to a different species.

Introduction and Premise

There have been numerous movements campaigning for equality, such as the Black liberation movement, the feminist movement, and the movement for LGBTQ+ rights.

Every liberation movement demands that we, as humans, expand our moral horizons by empathizing with the perspectives of those who are most disadvantaged. Singer argues that we should take this mental leap not only for humans but also for other species—animals.

He posits that we should extend the basic principle of equality, which we already apply to members of our own species, to other species as well.

To illustrate his argument, Singer references a satirical article written by a philosopher in 1972 during the rise of the feminist movement, titled A Vindication of the Rights of Brutes. The article mocked the feminist movement by claiming that, if women deserved equal rights, then by the same logic, animals should also be granted rights.

One might counter this argument by pointing out that, for example, women have the right to vote because they can make rational decisions, just like men. Dogs, on the other hand, lack the capacity to understand the concept of voting and therefore cannot possess the right to vote.

While men and women share many similarities, humans and animals differ significantly. One might conclude, then, that humans deserve equal rights among themselves, but the same rights should not necessarily extend to non-human animals.

Differences and Rights

There are differences between humans and animals, so it follows that there should be some differences in their rights.

Many feminists acknowledge the differences between men and women, and these differences sometimes give rise to distinct rights. For example, women have the right to an abortion—a right that does not apply to men since men cannot become pregnant. It is meaningless to discuss abortion rights for men.

In the same way, we can think about animals: a pig cannot vote, so it is meaningless to talk about its right to vote.

Extending the principle of equality to other groups does not mean that we must treat all groups the same or grant them identical rights.

Singer argues that the principle of equality is based on equality of consideration for different beings, which may lead to different treatments and different rights depending on their capacities and needs.

Grounds of Discrimination

Humans vary in shape, size, moral capacities, intellectual abilities, benevolence, and much more.

If equality were based on the actual equality of humans in these aspects, we would need to abandon the idea of demanding equality altogether.

Some might argue that there are no significant differences between races or sexes, asserting that just because a person is Black, for example, we cannot infer anything meaningful about them.

While this assumption may hold, it opens the door to a more advanced form of discrimination—one based on individual abilities. If we acknowledge that people differ in their abilities, we could develop a system where individuals are judged based on a “score” derived from their personal abilities. For instance, we might say that everyone with a score of 100 or less deserves fewer rights.

If equality were tied to the idea that races or sexes are identical in their abilities, it would fail to provide an argument against this type of discrimination based on personal abilities.

There is also a second reason why we should not base equality on the assumption that there are no differences between human categories such as race or sex. This reason is rooted in uncertainty: we do not know how much of the variation between human groups is due to genetic differences.

Equality should not be grounded in intelligence, moral capacities, or any other factual characteristic. Equality is a moral ideal. There is no reason to assume that factual differences should result in different moral considerations. Instead, equality is a prescription for how we should treat others.

By this logic, the same principles that lead us to condemn sexism and racism should also lead us to condemn speciesism. If higher intelligence in humans does not entitle some humans to greater rights, how can it justify exploiting non-human animals?

Equal Consideration as a Moral Principle

Singer quotes Bentham, who argues that the capacity for suffering is a vital characteristic that should form the basis for equal consideration.

The capacity for suffering is a prerequisite for being taken into equal consideration. For example, a stone cannot suffer and, therefore, does not need to be considered. A mouse, however, does have this capacity and should be taken into account.

If a being is capable of suffering, there is no reason not to consider its suffering. The principle of equality requires this. Conversely, if a being lacks the capability for suffering or enjoyment, it does not need to be taken into account.

This implies that sentience—the capacity to experience suffering and enjoyment—should be the foundation of equality. All other criteria, such as skin color, are arbitrary.

A racist violates this principle by valuing members of their own race more highly than others. Similarly, a speciesist violates the principle by valuing members of their own species above others without justification.

Humans Are Speciesist: The Suffering of Animals

The majority of urbanized people interact with other species primarily when they consume them as food, reducing the lives of these animals to mere subservience to our taste preferences.

We cannot justify the consumption of flesh by claiming it is nutritionally necessary, as sufficient protein can be obtained from plant-based sources.

Singer highlights the immense suffering humans inflict on animals, such as in factory farming and unnecessary cruelty in animal experiments.

He draws a parallel to the moral obligation faced by a white Southerner during the era of slavery. Just as they were morally compelled to challenge the traditions of their society and free the slaves, we, too, have a moral obligation to challenge the tradition of animal cruelty.

Opponents might argue that animal experiments save human lives, questioning whether one would be willing to sacrifice thousands of lives to avoid experimenting on a single animal. Singer counters this by asking a provocative question: would we perform such experiments on a human infant if it were the only way to save many lives?

If we are unwilling to use human infants for experiments, we should not use animals either. Animals, such as adult apes, cats, and mice, often have a greater awareness of their surroundings and the suffering they endure than a human infant does.

The two most significant speciesist practices are using animals for experiments and consuming them as food.

Philosophers and the Equality of Animals

There is a third, less prominent issue: the stance of philosophy itself. Philosophy, ideally, should challenge societal norms, yet many philosophers instead defend humanity’s current treatment of other species.

Moral and political philosophers often focus exclusively on human equality, rarely addressing the question of animal equality beyond a brief mention in a paragraph or two.

This avoidance stems from a key dilemma: if equality is defined based on shared characteristics, those characteristics must represent the lowest common denominator that applies to all humans. However, if we define equality this way, these characteristics will inevitably also apply to some animals. In this sense, asserting that all humans are equal would logically require acknowledging that some species are also equal to humans.

Singer references the philosopher Joel Feinberg, who argues that humans should be treated equally not because of merit but because they possess emotions, desires, and the capacity to live a fulfilling life. Singer contends that this reasoning can also apply to animals, as many animals are capable of living good lives.

Other philosophers reference the “intrinsic value of human individuals,” a concept rooted in Judeo-Christian doctrine, which places humans in a pivotal position as a bridge between lower forms of matter and God. While contemporary philosophers have stripped this idea of its original metaphysical framework, they continue to rely on it.

Singer critiques this notion, arguing that it often goes unchallenged and is frequently invoked in phrases like “the intrinsic dignity of humans,” particularly when no further arguments are available.

To illustrate his point, he considers the case of permanently intellectually disabled humans. These individuals are often considered to have intrinsic value, yet this becomes difficult to justify if intrinsic value is tied to specific characteristics such as intelligence or consciousness.

Conclusion

Singer advocates for extending equal consideration to animals, emphasizing that their treatment should align, to some extent, with the principles of equality we apply to humans.