A Defense of Abortion by Judith Thomson

Published: October 31, 2024

Paper Title: Judith Jarvis Thomson: A Defense of Abortion
Link to Paper: https://spot.colorado.edu/~heathwoo/Phil160,Fall02/thomson.htm
Date: Fall 1971
Paper Type: Moral Philosophy
Short Abstract:
In this paper, Judith Jarvis Thomson grants the assumption that a fetus has a right to life but argues that abortion can still be morally permissible due to the woman’s right to bodily autonomy.

Introduction and the Basic Premise

Most people who argue against abortion claim that a fetus is human from conception, asserting that human life begins at that point, bringing with it a right to life that abortion infringes upon.

They often argue that human development is continuous, making it difficult to draw a clear line where a person becomes human. Since any line would be arbitrary, they believe we should default to the earliest possible point—conception.

However, this is an example of the continuum fallacy. We could make the same argument about an acorn and an oak tree—so, should we call an acorn an oak?

Judith Jarvis Thomson personally believes that a fetus becomes human long before birth but not at conception, suggesting that calling a clump of cells “human” is like calling an acorn an oak. However, rather than debating when human life begins, she starts with the assumption that human life begins at conception and explores the morality of abortion from that standpoint.

The standard argument against abortion is as follows: every person has a right to life; a fetus is a person; therefore, a fetus has a right to life. Consequently, the fetus may not be killed.

Thomson then introduces her famous Violinist thought experiment, which forms the basis of her argument.

Imagine that one day you wake up in bed connected to a world-famous violinist. This violinist has a fatal kidney ailment, and you have the only matching blood type necessary to save him. A society of music lovers has kidnapped you and connected his circulatory system to yours so that your kidneys can keep him alive. The hospital director then tells you, “Look, we’re sorry you were kidnapped. But if you unplug the violinist, he will die. However, if you stay connected for nine months, he can safely be unplugged."

From this scenario, Thomson poses the central question: Do you have to remain connected to the violinist? What if we extended or shortened the time required? You were kidnapped and did not volunteer, so does a person only have a right to life if they were not conceived through rape?

Conservative individuals who believe that human life begins at conception often argue that there should be no exceptions for cases of rape, with some even asserting that abortion is wrong even if the pregnancy would endanger the mother’s life.

Abortions When the Mother’s Life is Threatened

Let’s assume a woman has become pregnant and now learns that she has a cardiac condition that will result in her death if she gives birth. Both the mother and the child have a right to life, but the mother also has a right to bodily autonomy. Should these rights be weighed together, and if so, do the mother’s rights outweigh the fetus’s rights?

It is often argued that, in this case, performing an abortion would involve directly killing the fetus, while doing nothing would not directly kill the mother but rather allow her to die. This argument can be broken down into a few cases:

1. Directly killing an innocent person is always wrong and not allowed. → abortion forbidden.
2. Directly killing an innocent person is murder, and murder is always wrong. → abortion forbidden.
3. The duty to not kill an innocent person outweighs the duty to prevent someone from dying. → abortion forbidden.
4. It is preferable to let a person die rather than to directly kill them. → abortion forbidden.

Now consider case 2: if directly killing the fetus would be murder, then a mother ending the life of the person inside her through an abortion to save herself would be wrong. Does that mean she has to simply wait for her own death?

Returning to the violinist example, imagine the hospital director tells you, “Staying connected to the violinist will put additional stress on your body, and you will die within a few months. But you need to stay connected, or the violinist will die.” Is it reasonable to ask this of you?

Often, discussions about abortion focus on the role of a third party, such as a doctor, instead of on the mother herself. But what if we focus on the mother?

Imagine you wake up trapped in a tiny house with a baby that is rapidly growing. Within minutes, you will be crushed to death by it. Innocent as the child may be, you have the right to defend yourself; you do not have to wait passively while it crushes you to death.

When one person threatens another, and both are innocent, bystanders may not have the right to intervene, but the threatened person does. If someone threatens your life, you have the right to defend it.

Thus, a mother has the same right to defend her life against a fetus growing inside her if it threatens her survival.

Third Parties and Abortion

From this perspective, we could weaken the position to: abortion is permissible to save a mother’s life, but it is only allowed if performed by the mother herself—not by a third party. But is this morally right?

It’s not as if the mother and the baby are renting the same house together; it is more akin to the mother owning the house.

Imagine that Jones has found a coat he needs to keep from freezing, but Smith also needs the coat to survive. It would not be impartial to say, “I cannot choose who has the right to the coat between you two,” if the coat actually belongs to Smith.

Justice in this case would mean that Jones returns the coat to Smith, even if it leads to Jones freezing to death. However, you would also have the right to refuse to help Smith retrieve his coat in this scenario.

Therefore, we shouldn’t say “I cannot choose” but rather “I will not act,” which itself is a moral judgment.

In the same way, Judith argues that while a doctor is not obligated to perform an abortion, they should be permitted to do so.

Abortions When the Mother’s Life is Not in Danger

Now let’s consider the situation where a woman seeks an abortion for reasons less serious than preserving her own life.

Isn’t the child’s right to life stronger than the mother’s right to autonomy over her body? But what does right to life mean in this context? Does it imply that the violinist has the right to use your kidneys simply because he would die without them?

Does the right to life mean merely the right not to be killed? Or does it imply the right to the bare minimum one needs to continue living?

Suppose I am terminally ill, and the only thing that can save my life is the touch of the famous actor Ryan Gosling. It would be kind of him to fly out to help, but I have no right to demand this of him.

Returning to the violinist example, similarly, the violinist does not have the right to use your kidney unless you grant him permission.

If the right to life is merely the right not to be killed, then no one can unplug the violinist from you, suggesting he has a positive right to use your kidney.

In this section, Judith argues that having a right to life does not guarantee either the right to be granted use of or to continue using another person’s body.

Consent and Abortion

Imagine a scenario where an older boy and his younger brother are given one box of chocolates for Christmas to share. If the older brother takes all the chocolates for himself, he is being unjust, as his brother has the right to half of them.

Returning to the violinist example, if you decide to unplug yourself from the violinist after learning that you would otherwise have to stay connected to him for nine years, this action is not unjust. The violinist has no right to use your kidney, even though he will die as a result.

From this, Judith argues that the right to life is not simply the right not to be killed but rather the right not to be killed unjustly.

This means that to determine if an abortion is moral or not, we need to assess whether it constitutes justified killing.

In the case of rape, the mother did not give permission for the baby to enter her “house,” making this scenario more akin to unplugging from the violinist. In the case of consensual intercourse, however, there is the possibility of pregnancy. Does this mean the mother has implicitly invited the fetus into her “house”? If so, this situation is more like taking chocolate away from the boy than unplugging from the violinist.

Now, imagine you open a window to let fresh air in, and a burglar enters through it. Did you invite the burglar? Certainly not. This is even more true if you took precautions, such as putting bars on the window to keep burglars out. In a similar way, you haven’t “invited” a fetus simply because birth control failed.

Thus, Judith establishes that in cases where the unborn person has no right to use the mother’s body, abortion is a justified killing and, therefore, morally permissible.

Burden of Pregnancy: Timeframe and Effort

Suppose you learn that, instead of needing nine months, the violinist needs only nine minutes, and it has no effect on your health. In that case, it seems like you ought to let the violinist use your kidney.

But if the violinist instead needs to stay connected to you for nine years and it impacts your health, this feels quite different.

Returning to the example of the famous actor’s healing touch, it seems reasonable that I would not have the right to demand it if the actor had to fly across the country. However, if the actor were in the room right next to me, perhaps I would have the right to request it.

All of this suggests that the right to life depends on the effort required to fulfill it.

So, should you let the violinist use your kidney for just one hour? You have the right to refuse, but in doing so, you might resemble the boy with all the chocolates who refuses to share—not immoral, but perhaps indecent.

Conclusion

Judith argues that women are expected to be “Good Samaritans” who always help in cases like the violinist’s, rather than “minimally decent Samaritans,” who only help when it is absolutely necessary.

Finally, she contends that a fetus does not carry any special responsibilities simply by being related to its mother, especially if the mother took all reasonable precautions to avoid pregnancy.

Personal Reflections and Rebuttals

Throughout her arguments, Judith assumes that fetuses have a right to life. From there, she builds a case that women have certain rights to bodily autonomy, which, in some instances, she argues should outweigh the fetus’s right to life. My critique of her argument can be broken down into four areas:

1. Consent
2. Value of Life vs. Bodily Autonomy
3. Hypocrisy
4. Letting Die vs. Killing

Consent
A central point in Judith’s argument is the Violinist example, which I believe is an accurate analogy for cases of rape. However, is it as applicable when no rape has occurred? Engaging in intercourse comes with the known risk of pregnancy, much like smoking carries a known risk of lung cancer. If someone develops cancer due to smoking, society might treat the condition but would never condone killing someone else to give the smoker a new lung. In her defense, Judith presents a counterexample: she imagines a world where “people-seeds” drift through the air, and even with every precaution (short of staying indoors forever), one of these “seeds” might still take root in your home. In such a scenario, would you be obligated to care for it?

My response is that such a world is so fundamentally different from ours that it does not make a fair comparison. In that hypothetical world, people would likely view life differently from how we do.

Value of Life vs. Bodily Autonomy
Consider this scenario: two women are stranded in a remote cabin due to heavy snow. Both give birth, but one mother dies. When rescuers arrive, they find that one baby has died because the surviving mother refused to breastfeed, believing it would violate her bodily autonomy. People would likely find this horrifying.

One might counter that pregnancy is a much greater burden than breastfeeding. Still, my point is that society accepts some restrictions on bodily autonomy when they serve a higher purpose. Another example is our collective disapproval of abandoning disabled children, even if they place a high burden on their caregivers. Arguably, raising a disabled child could be an even more demanding burden than pregnancy because of the extended timeframe and effort involved. So if we do not support abandonment there, why in the case of abortion?

Hypocrisy
Judith’s argument for bodily autonomy conflicts with many areas where we do not prioritize individual bodily autonomy. Consider these examples:

• Laws against suicide
• Assisted suicide restrictions
• Drug prohibitions
• Prohibitions on selling kidneys
• Restrictions on prostitution
• Laws against incest

If we accept the bodily autonomy argument fully, we would have to allow each of the above, yet most people would likely disagree with at least some of them.

Letting Die vs. Killing
In the Violinist example, by unplugging yourself, you let the violinist die. However, this is not fully analogous to abortion, as abortion actively terminates a life. It would be closer to having a doctor unplug the violinist and then shoot him, which most people would see as morally not right.

Finally, Judith suggests that “nobody has a right to your kidney unless you give them that right.” But is this always true? If a single kidney could save 10 people, 100, or even all of humanity, could someone still justifiably refuse to donate it? I believe that when the stakes scale up, at some point, personal autonomy must yield to the greater good.

Conclusion
Overall, I find the bodily autonomy argument lacking for the reasons outlined above. It would even justify abortions in the eighth month or, theoretically, after birth, given that caregiving also limits bodily autonomy. I believe that the central issue here is not bodily autonomy but rather the question: when does personhood truly begin?