Euthyphro

July 4, 2025 | 598 words | 3min read

Paper Title: Euthyphro
Link to Paper: https://classics.mit.edu/Plato/euthyfro.html
Date: 380 B.C.E
Paper Type: Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
Short Abstract:
Euthyphro is a Platonic dialogue that explores the definition of piety.

Like all Platonic dialogues, it begins with Socrates questioning a person—in this case, Euthyphro—about the nature of a particular concept. In this dialogue, the topic is piety. Socrates challenges Euthyphro’s definitions and helps refine them over the course of the conversation.

1. Definition of Piety:

Piety is prosecuting wrongdoers.

Euthyphro gives the example of prosecuting his own father for the murder of a servant as an act of piety.

Socrates’ objection: This is merely an example of piety, not a definition. Piety likely includes more than just prosecuting wrongdoers—such as worship, sacrifice, or other religious acts.

2. Definition of Piety:

Piety is what is pleasing to the gods.

Socrates’ objection: In ancient Greece, the gods often disagreed and even fought with each other. Therefore, what pleases one god may displease another. This implies that an action could be both pious and impious at the same time, which is contradictory.

3. Definition of Piety:

Piety is what is pleasing to all the gods.

Socrates’ objection: This leads to the famous Euthyphro Dilemma:

“Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious? Or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?”

This can be restated as:

• Option A: Something is pious on its own; the gods recognize this and love it for that reason.
• Option B: Something becomes pious because the gods love it.

If Option B is true, then piety is arbitrary—it depends entirely on the gods’ preferences. If the gods loved murder, then murder would be pious.

If Option A is true, then piety exists independently of the gods, and they merely recognize it.

Socrates makes the point:

“Things are not inherently beloved; they become beloved because someone loves them.”

The same applies to piety.

So we get a contradiction:

• If something is pious because the gods love it → their love defines piety.
• If the gods love something because it is pious → piety must exist before their love.

Conclusion: Defining piety as “what is loved by all the gods” fails to explain what piety is in itself. It simply shifts the question to what this pious nature actually is.

4. Definition of Piety:

Piety is a part of justice; the part that concerns attending to the gods, while the rest of justice concerns human beings.

Socrates’ objection: What does “attending to the gods” mean?

• If it means improving or benefiting the gods, as a dog-attendant benefits a dog’s health, this would be blasphemous—gods are perfect and cannot be improved by humans.
• If it simply means serving the gods, the question becomes: What is the purpose of this service? What do the gods gain from it?

If the answer is that the gods are pleased by it, then we have returned to the third definition—and its problems.

5. Definition of Piety:

Piety is knowledge of how to sacrifice and pray.

Socrates’ objection: If piety is knowledge of how to give the gods what they want (sacrifice) and how to ask for things (prayer), then it resembles a kind of trade or transaction—offering gifts in exchange for favors.

Euthyphro objects, saying that sacrifices are gifts of honor, not transactions. Socrates replies that this is essentially the same as saying that piety is “what pleases the gods,” which again leads us back to the earlier problems.

Conclusion: At this point, the dialogue ends with both Socrates and Euthyphro admitting that no progress has been made. The definition of piety remains unclear.

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