Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong

January 7, 2025 | 2,931 words | 14min read

Paper Title: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong
Link to Paper: 1977
Date: https://philpapers.org/rec/MACEIR
Paper Type: Philosophy, Ethics, Metaethics
Short Abstract:
In his famous book, John Leslie Mackie proposes his well-known error theory, a metaethical framework that argues every moral statement is universally false.

1. Moral Scepticism

There are no objective moral values. Some may find this statement trivially true, others might be outraged, and some may argue that the notion is meaningless in the first place.

The claim that there are no objective values extends beyond moral goodness to include concepts such as rightness, wrongness, duty, obligation, the idea of an action being rotten, and so on.

This view can be referred to as moral scepticism, but people often misunderstand what it entails. It’s important to distinguish between first-order and second-order views.

A moral sceptic might reject all moral judgments or only some moral judgments, but these are first-order views. Second-order morality, however, concerns the nature of morality itself. First-order and second-order views are entirely independent.

For instance, one can hold strong moral views while believing that morality is merely a reflection of personal attitudes or preferences. Conversely, someone could reject all established morality while maintaining that objective moral truths exist.

Mackie’s concern, however, lies specifically with the objectivity of morality.

2. Subjectivism

Sometimes, people refer to this position as subjectivism instead of moral scepticism. However, subjectivism, like scepticism, has multiple meanings and can apply to either first-order or second-order views.

For example, a first-order subjectivist might believe that everyone ought to do what they personally think they should. Adding to the confusion, several second-order positions might also be classified as subjectivism.

Some people suggest that morality is simply the approval of certain actions. However, this is distinct from scepticism, as scepticism addresses what morality isn’t rather than what it is.

Mackie’s theory is further distinguished because it focuses on the ontology of morality rather than its linguistic or epistemological aspects.

First-order moral subjectivists often imply a form of second-order subjectivism—or what Mackie refers to as moral scepticism—because they do not believe in objective moral values. However, the reverse is not true: moral scepticism, which denies the existence of objective values, does not necessarily require specific views about what moral statements mean.

3. The Multiplicity of Second-Order Questions

There is not just one second-order question, but many. For example: What is the meaning and use of ethical terms? How should ethical concepts be analyzed? Are moral statements universalizable?

Another significant question concerns the ontological nature of morality, as opposed to linguistic or conceptual inquiries. This question asks: What is the nature of goodness or rightness?

Contemporary philosophers have primarily focused on linguistic inquiries about morality. These investigations are similar to examining the meanings of terms like “see” or “hear.”

Mackie argues that this focus on meaning is misplaced. The more philosophers have worked on the meaning of moral statements, the more complex and fragmented the discourse has become. Thus, no simple account of meaning can fully capture the nature of moral statements.

4. Is Objectivity a Real Issue?

The question of whether objectivity in morality is a real issue has been debated since the time of the Greek Sophists, and later by Hobbes and Hume.

For example, R.M. Hare argues that nobody truly understands what is meant by “the objectivity of values.” If one person claims a certain action is wrong while another claims it is right, an objectivist might say they are contradicting each other. A subjectivist, on the other hand, might interpret this disagreement as one person approving of the action while the other disapproves.

But what, then, is the difference between objectivism and subjectivism? A subjectivist might also claim that the first person is negating what the second has said. Is there a meaningful distinction between negation and contradiction? Hare suggests there is not. He argues that to say a judgment is “wrong” is essentially the same as negating it.

Hare sums up this issue as follows:

“Think of one world into whose fabric values are objectively built; and think of another in which those values have been annihilated. And remember that in both worlds, the people in them go on being concerned about the same things—there is no difference in the ‘subjective’ concern which people have for things, only in their ‘objective’ value. Now I ask, ‘What is the difference between the states of affairs in these two worlds?’ Can any answer be given except ‘None whatever’?”

Mackie, however, argues that there is a difference. In a world where objectivity is built into morality, one would expect to find evidence that validates claims of objectivity. In a world where objectivity has been annihilated, one would not find such evidence; instead, people would rely on the emotive and subjective aspects of morality.

Mackie also points out that subjectivity does not rule out shared values. This idea is known as intersubjectivity—common moral views can arise through agreements between individuals or groups.

It’s important to distinguish between objectivism and descriptivism. Descriptivism is a theory about the meaning of ethical statements, asserting that they are purely descriptive. However, it does not make any claims about the ontology of morality.

Philosophical theories, such as Berkeley’s subjective idealism, could be compatible with descriptivism. On the other hand, mainstream European moral philosophy—from Plato onward—often views morality as both partly descriptive, partly action-guiding, and objectivist.

From a metaphysical perspective, discovering a realm filled with objective values—akin to Plato’s theory of forms—would have radical implications. It would also significantly impact epistemology as well, particularly the mechanisms by which we arrive at moral knowledge.

Finally, if moral objectivism were proven true, it would refute egoism as a normative ethical theory. For example, if an egoist claims their happiness is objectively desirable, a utilitarian could argue that the egoist’s happiness is no more valuable than that of any other person experiencing similar happiness.

5. Standards of Evaluation

One way to state the thesis that there are no objective values is to claim that value statements cannot be either true or false. However, this too can be misunderstood, as certain value statements are undoubtedly true or false, even if there are no objective values.

Evaluations of any kind often rely on commonly agreed-upon and assumed standards—for example, championships in skating or diving, flower shows, or beauty contests. Given a sufficiently determined standard, it becomes an objective matter of truth whether a particular contestant has measured up to those standards or not.

The subjectivity lies not in the process of evaluation itself but in how we choose the standards.

In every field, there is an objective distinction between justice and injustice. A decision or prize is unjust if it deviates from the agreed-upon standard relevant to the contest. For instance, if one diver’s performance better aligns with the accepted standard than another’s, it would be unjust for the latter to win. In this way, justice can be considered objective. However, whether certain decisions are just or unjust is not objectively determined.

A subjectivist can argue that the choice of standards is not objective, yet they may also hold that standards are not entirely arbitrary. For example, it would not make sense to evaluate a diving contest based on how high competitors can jump.

Something might be considered “good” insofar as it satisfies a particular desire, but the objectivity of the relationship between satisfaction and desire does not confer objective value on the desire itself.

6. Hypothetical and Categorical Imperatives

Kant differentiates between hypothetical and categorical imperatives. A hypothetical imperative takes the form: “If you want X, do Y.” You perform Y only for the sake of achieving X. By contrast, a categorical imperative takes the form: “You ought to do Y,” and you perform Y irrespective of any other desires or goals.

A categorical imperative expresses a reason for acting that is unconditional—one that does not depend on the agent’s present desires. For example, “You ought to dance.” If the implied reason is that you enjoy dancing, this remains a hypothetical imperative because the action is still contingent on a personal desire.

Kant argues that morality is expressed through categorical imperatives. Mackie, however, opposes this view, claiming that there are no objective values. Consequently, he denies the existence of any objectively valid categorical imperative.

In other words, Mackie contends that somewhere in the reasoning behind categorical imperatives—perhaps in one of the premises—there is something that cannot be objectively validated. For example, a premise that is not simply true but relies on subjective input or assumptions.

7. The Claim to Objectivity

Some might argue that valuing, preferring, choosing, recommending, and similar activities are human activities, and as such, there is no need to look for objective values that exist prior to these actions.

However, this should not be conceded too easily. The European moral philosophical tradition, from thinkers such as Plato, Kant, and Sidgwick, has long upheld the idea that there are objective values:

• Kant claims that his categorical imperatives are objectively true.
• Aristotle begins Nicomachean Ethics by stating that the good is that which all things aim for, which he identifies as eudaimonia, and which is intrinsically desirable—not good simply because we desire it.
• The rationalist Samuel Clarke believes that humans have eternal, necessary truths bestowed by God, which are objectively true.
• The sentimentalist Hutcheson defines goodness as something objective.

This pervasive thought about objectivism arises not only from philosophical tradition but also from the meaning of moral terms, which are partly derived from religion.

“Someone in a state of moral perplexity, wondering whether it would be wrong for him to engage, say, in research related to bacteriological warfare, wants to arrive at some judgment about this concrete case.
The question is not, for example, whether he really wants to do this work, whether it will satisfy or dissatisfy him, whether he will, in the long run, have a positive attitude towards it, or even whether this is an action of a sort that he can happily and sincerely recommend in all relevantly similar cases. Nor is he even wondering just whether to recommend such an action in all relevantly similar cases.
He wants to know whether this course of action would be wrong in itself. Something like this is the everyday objectivist concept of which talk about non-natural qualities is a philosopher’s reconstruction.”

The view that moral statements are not objective is problematic, even for proponents of this stance, such as Bertrand Russell, who admits:

“I can only say that while my own opinion as to ethics does not satisfy me, other people’s satisfy me still less.”

Thus, Mackie believes that moral judgments have some claim to objectivity. While he denies that objective values exist in any real sense, error theory must oppose the assumptions built into our language and common sense. This requires very strong support, which he provides by using the arguments of relativity and the argument from queerness.

8. The Argument from Relativity

The argument from relativity suggests that the variety of moral rules and differences between societies implies that objective values cannot possibly exist. The radical differences in first-order moral judgments make it difficult to treat them as discussions about the same objective truth.

Disagreements in science do not indicate that there is no objective truth in these fields. These scientific disagreements arise from speculative inferences based on inadequate evidence. Disagreements about moral codes, on the other hand, seem to reflect people participating in different ways of life.

It is not that people participate in monogamous life because they approve of it. Instead, it seems that people approve of monogamous life because they participate in a monogamous society.

The argument from relativity has some force because the variation in moral codes is better explained by the hypothesis that they reflect ways of life, rather than by the hypothesis that they express perceptions of objective moral values.

A well-known counter to this argument is that there seems to be a small set of values that appear universal and thus objective. Other moral rules could then be derived from these foundational principles to promote the general happiness of the group or society.

However, this counterargument can be challenged by the fact that different cultures and traditions seem to have a significant influence on which moral rules are derived from these principles. In other words, moral rules could be vastly different if the environment had been different.

9. The Argument from Queerness

The argument from queerness has two parts: metaphysical and epistemological. The argument asserts that if there were objective values, they would be utterly strange—different from anything else in the universe. To be aware of them, we would need some special faculty for moral perception, distinct from perceiving anything else.

The central thesis of intuitionism is something that every objectivist view is committed to. If we ask how to become aware of these moral properties, none of our ordinary senses could explain it. In short, we would need a special kind of intuition.

One response an objectivist might offer is to pull other branches of philosophy into the muddle with them. They could argue that moral knowledge isn’t the only area where we face this problem of empiricism. Concepts like essence, numbers, identity, solidity, inertia, substance, and the existence of time and space also face the same issue. Mackie argues that one can show from empirical foundations how we can construct these ideas, but he leaves it out here because it would be too lengthy to explore.

Another way to demonstrate the queerness is by asking what the connection is between objective moral qualities and natural features. How is the fact of deliberate cruelty connected to the moral fact that it is wrong? Not only would we need to be able to perceive the moral wrongness property, but also how it relates to the natural facts.

A much simpler answer would be to say that morality is a subjective response causally related to natural features.

10. Patterns of Objectification

These two considerations suggest that we should reject the common view that moral values are objective, provided that we can explain how such a false belief has become established.

Hume theorizes that the mind has a “propensity to spread itself to external objects,” and in this way, we can understand the seemingly objective quality of moral values arising from what we could call projections. For example, if a fungus fills us with disgust, we might say the fungus is foul, even though “foulness” is a non-natural quality that a fungus cannot really have.

But there is more at work. Moral rules partly originate in society, which pressures individuals to adhere to these rules. People then internalize these rules, and as a result, they might come to see morality as objective.

Moral objectivism, in this sense, is beneficial in society, as it helps regulate interpersonal relationships and control how people act toward each other. Thus, we want moral judgments to be authoritative not only for ourselves but for others as well.

We can also ask, where do words like “ought to” or “must” come from, as they imply that they are backed up by something? Whose demands or wants are in question—the agent’s, the speaker’s, or those of an indefinite multitude of people (i.e., society)? In some sense, all of them combined, as these are the internalized demands of the group, which the speaker expresses as a member of this group.

Another way of explaining this is by referring to Anscombe, who argues that morality is like a system of laws whose legislator has been removed. Anscombe believes that the legislator is God, and the system is Christianity.

11. The General Goal of Human Life

For people like Aristotle and Aquinas, the fundamental goal of human life is to be a good person. This approach has two interpretations:

1. Descriptive: Something is good for man or the general human life if this is what people in fact pursue or will find ultimately satisfying, or if it enables us to make sense of human striving.
2. Normative: Something is good for man or the general human life if it represents man’s proper end—that is, what he ought to be striving after.

The first statement is descriptive, while the second is normative. Mackie has no problem with either of these interpretations, as long as one acknowledges that there might be more diversity in fundamental purposes and that this is a subjective prescription put forward by the speaker without evoking anything objective.

Because the arguments from queerness and relativity can be applied to both morality and the goal of human life, Mackie questions the objectivity of the goal of human life as well.

The only solution Mackie sees to claim an objective goal for human life is God. However, since he does not believe that the existence of God is defendable, he dismisses this option.

My Thoughts

In Chapter 5, Mackie claims that justice is objective insofar as “a finding/prize is unjust if it varies with the agreed standard for the contest in question.” I wonder how this plays out in the modern world, especially with affirmative action laws and policies, which seek to explicitly benefit marginalized groups. For example, some colleges in the USA admit people of marginalized races with lower scores than someone from another race with a higher score. In one way, this could be considered unjust, as it violates the agreed-upon contract with which one enters the college.

On the other hand, one could argue that the agreed-upon contest now factors in race as well, and as such, preferring some people because of their race could be seen as just.