Moral Luck

January 12, 2026 | 777 words | 4min read

Paper Title: Moral Luck

Link to Paper: https://philpapers.org/rec/WILMLP-3

Date: 1973

Paper Type: Ethics, Moral Luck

Short Abstract Luck is a major part of morality.

1. Introduction

Ancient philosophical traditions (Stoic, Cynic, Virtue Ethics) asked what constitutes a good life. They argued that a good life entails happiness, achievable through reflective tranquility, self-sufficiency, and the cultivation of virtue. What lies outside oneself, external events, is largely uncontrollable and subject to luck. The ideal sage is thus immune to incidentals, though their state still depends on constitutive luck, such as upbringing.

This idea of making the good life independent of external contingencies is later picked up by Kant through the Categorical Imperative, which evaluates actions based on intention rather than outcomes. Moral agency thus becomes accessible to all, independent of upbringing, offering a sense of fairness.

However, Kant is not entirely immune to luck: dispositions, motives, and capacities are still conditioned by constitutive luck.

In the present discussion, Williams focuses on rational justification in decision-making under uncertainty. Here, “luck” is understood broadly as any factor beyond the agent’s control.

2. The Gauguin Example

Consider an artist, Gauguin, who pursues art over social obligations. Two scenarios are presented:

1. Indifference scenario: Gauguin does not care about others’ claims; art emerges naturally.
   • No conflict between moral duty and personal ambition; not the focus here.
2. Concerned scenario: Gauguin cares about obligations but chooses art anyway.
   • Conflict arises between moral duty and personal ambition.

His life choice is uncertain, success in art is not guaranteed. Choices are made in hope of realizing a possibility, not guaranteed outcomes:

• Success → Gauguin is justified in choosing that life.
• Failure → No basis for justification; the choice is retrospectively judged wrong.

Retrospective justification is central: moral rules or utilitarian formulas fail to fully guide such uncertain choices:

• Rule-based: Cannot handle unpredictability of outcomes.
• Utilitarian: Evaluates outcomes, not the agent’s decision or deliberation.

We can distinguish two types of failure:

• Extrinsic failure: Events outside the agent’s control (e.g., Gauguin injures his hand). The project fails, but the choice is not morally unjustified.
• Intrinsic failure: Failure due to the agent’s own capacities (e.g., he lacks talent as a painter). The project fails because he was not capable, making the choice unjustified.

Thus, success or failure is shaped by:

• Extrinsic luck: External factors affecting outcomes.
• Intrinsic luck: Factors intrinsic to the agent (capacity, talent, dispositions).

3. Regret, Agent-Regret, and Responsibility

We can distinguish:

• General regret: “How much better if it had been otherwise?” Applies even to external events and is observable by others.
• Agent-regret: Directed specifically at one’s own actions or participation. Requires first-person perspective and a sense of agency.

Human actions are embedded in a web of consequences, many beyond our control. Agent-regret acknowledges this web: unintended outcomes still reflect on us as agents.

For example, Gauguin’s wish that he had acted otherwise arises only if he fails. Before success or failure is known, the wish is underdeveloped. Even morally required actions may generate agent-regret if outcomes leave something unsatisfied.

Agent-regret can also exist in involuntary cases (e.g., a driver causing an accident through no fault of their own), highlighting that moral evaluation is not purely about intent or control.

4. Justification and Retrospective Evaluation

The central problem: What does it mean for an agent to be “justified” after the fact, especially under uncertainty?

• Good deliberation → bad outcome: The agent may regret the outcome but still stands by their reasoning. They do not wish they had acted differently at the level of deliberative rationality.
• Bad deliberation → good outcome (luck): The agent may feel glad about the outcome, even while recognizing errors in reasoning.

Key point: Retrospective justification separates evaluation of deliberation from outcomes, though both influence the agent’s feelings.

Even if justified retrospectively, those harmed may still have justified grievances. The agent cannot force others to accept their justification. Moral evaluation is not absolute, being influenced by contingency and luck.

Gratitude or admiration for someone like Gauguin reflects the fact that moral constraints are not supreme, not mere “amoral indulgence.”

For major life projects, success or failure is significant because it affects the agent’s life perspective:

• Intrinsic failure: Project reveals itself as empty; agent is unjustified.
• Extrinsic failure: Project fails due to external factors; the agent retains partial justification and may build new aspirations.

Finally, acknowledging moral luck and limits of morality is crucial. Morality cannot fully transcend luck, but it remains meaningful in how agents relate to their projects and their regrets.

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